ABSTRACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Sudden and sharp capital inflow reversals have been a key feature of recent emerging market crises. While short-term flows have been mostly volatile and unwanted, longterm capital flows such as foreign direct investment (f<1JI), which tend to be more stable, are increasingly desirable (Lipsey widely accepted as being the most important motivations.
Given this importance, FDI as a source of capital in the developing world has increased considerably over the past two decades -see Figure 1 -as a reflection of the improvements in the local investment perceived by investor, on account of the adoption by 80 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 and technical skills, is Source: World Bank (2006) . 39 many countries of sound macroeconomic and structural reform measures (Chan and Gemayel, 2004) .
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Mainly, this tremendous increase in FDI is undoubtedly related to the globalization of
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows: section two briefly presents a theoretical analysis on the relationship between foreign direct investment inflows and different kinds of risks in the MENA counties; section three elucidates the the world economy and the integration of eexperimental Design (methodology) and the financial markets, however, despite this describes the variables and their sources. fact; overall FDI to the MENA region was Section four illustrates the empirical results. scant during this period (see Table 1 ).
Section five presents a discussion of the results and finally section six conclude the In many instances a rational explanation can paper. be found, as in countries facing conflicts. However, in many other cases such an observation is confusing, as one would expect multinational companies to take advantage of the low production costs in the MENA region. Many observers such as Eid and Paua (2002) and Onyeiwu (2003) among others have argued that the capacity of many MENA countries to attract FDI has so far been principally determined by the existence of natural resources, as in the case of Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. This paper is motivated by the fact that, despite large increases in FDI in emerging markets since the 1980s, the MENA region share was dismal, while net FDI inflows as a percentage of GDP has grown by an average of six fold between 1985 and 2004 in most of the other regions, whilst of MENA has stagnated during that period (see Table 1 ).
II. THEORETICALANALYSIS
Historically, countries in the MENA region have a higher level of instability associated with investment risk relative to DCs. In some cases a rational explanation can be found as, for example, for countries experiencing conflict like Algeria and Sudan; which their very difficult internal conflict is a major impediment to any investment (Garibaldi, et al., 2002) . This fact is supported by Lucas (1990) , when he argues that the reason why multinationa1companies continue to produce in high-cost developed countries is because among other factors, these countries are considered to be politically stable, whereas, investments in many "low-cost" countries, by contrast, are exposed to political risk.
Many empirical studies such as Hawkins and Lockwood (2001), and Janeba (2002) among others have concluded that political (in) stability was found to have an impact on the inflow of FDI. Same result can be said regarding the other MENA countries (Alessandrini, 2000; Sadik and Bolbol, 2003; Onyeiwu, 2003; Mellahi, et al., 2003) .
However, in many other cases such an observation is confusing, especially in countries whose their political situation is stable, and yet they suffer from a low level of FDI. In other words, while a stable political environment is desirable, it is not a sufficient condition for attracting FDI; as one would expect multinational companies to take advantage of the low production costs in the MENA region, other would expect the capacity for the MENA countries to attract accounted for almost 2. 8% of total FDI inflow in the DCs. First reason for that is the serious internal/ regional political instability facing major MENA countries (Algeria, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, Palestine, Iraq and Sudan) manage to affect their international relations (Eid and Paua, 2003) . Second reason is that the MENA countries are characterized of institutional instability and predictability (Ngowi, 2001) , which cause a reduction in the investor's confidence, pose obstacles to sustained FDI flows, and complicate the economic development of these countries. That even hosts countries that suffer from such problems and at the same time possess abundant natural resources, how further incentives they may provide, they are still considered to be political unstable countries (Ana, 1997) . Third reason is the fact that the macroeconomic environment in several FDI has so far been principally determined by the existence of natural resources (Chan Gemayel, 2004) , but despite these expectations the results are still below the par.
According to UNCTAD (2002) , FDI to the MENA countries recorded a longer decline of 33% dropping in 2002, from $6.7 billion in 2001 to $4.5 billion in 2002, which MENA countries is still characterized by constraints such -see Table 2 -, in a way that makes maintaining macroeconomic stability is a big challenge for many MENA countries (Iqbal, 2001 ).
One could believe tl;lat such weaknesses do explain why politically stable countries in the MENA region suffer from a high level of uncertainly that make them receive 41 a tiny share of FDI in compare with other politically unstable countries. The fourth reason has been given by Alessandrini (2000) in his analysis of the FDI in the Mediterranean Region, he argues that the authorization regimes, with the exception of Israel and Lebanon, still lack automatism and transport procedures which is something not preferable for the foreign investors (although some improvements have been undertaken in Algeria, Jordan, Palestine and Morocco).
Certainly, the environment climate, macroeconomic performance and the political (in) stability are important issues in determining the location of FDI. However, the cultural environment (communications, religions, values and ideologies, and social structure) has also special importance in multinational business. The importance of understanding the cultures of countries in which a multinational company operates -as well as similarities and differences among those cultures -becomes clear when we look at the multitude of modem manager's blunders in multinational business (Miroshnik, 2002) .
Management practices that are suited for their own culture environment may bring about undesirable, perhaps terrible, consequences in another culture. For example, problems result when managers' export marketing campaigns developed in one country without adapting them to another country. For instance; Muslim people will never eat any food if it is packed in a box with a picture of any naked human. In addition, cultural diversity causes problems when the organization must reach a single agreement. For instance; negotiations between Japanese and Arabic people are very difficult, because of the big differences in the decision-making and the legal system. Japanese never say "no", it is very impolite in their opinion, but it does not mean that they agree, so they will say, "yes, we are absolutely disagreeing". However, for the Arabs, if the partner says "yes", it is the time to celebrate the success. To avoid such problems: either the multinationals choose a location where the physical distance is shorter and cultural barriers are easily overcome (Galan and Benito, 2001) , for example, the gravity model used by Gao (2005) shows that the huge amount of FDI inflow from Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong to China is mainly due to the cultural ties and geography closeness between them. Or it can allocate in a far distance place; where the foreign investor choose to have a partnership from appropriate local business to help him deal with the national culture difference (Pan and Chi, 1999) . Otherwise, to work alone; where in this case the modem managers must understand the core concept of the culture. To ignore cultural differences is unproductive, however; judging cultural differences as good or bad can lead to inappropriate, racist, sexist, and ethnocentric behaviors (Hanson, 1999) , while, recognizing cultural differences does not (Adler, 1983a; 1983b 
Where FDI(t) is a 4x1 column vector ofFDI flows and three kinds of risks (inflation mte, logarithm political risk index and logarithm corruption index) in time t. C is a 4xl column vector of constant terms, A(k) is a 4x4 matrix of Coefficients such that the (i, j)th component of A(k) measures the direct effect that a change in the ith variable has upon the jth variable after k periods.
In particular, the ith component of e (t) Sims (1980) . Moreover,the V ARrequiresthedetermination of the appropriate lag structure in the system. The choose of the lag structure based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) in conjunction with analyzing the estimated model's residuals, so they do not exhibit any significant autocorrelation.
a. Data Sources
The "raw" data set for this study includes the whole population of Middle East and North Africa Countries; which accounts for 19 countries. However, the actual estimation of the model has removed two countries oflraq and Palestine, since the war on the first one and the occupation on the second one cause unavailability of data. With this restriction and missing country observations, the sample abates to 17 countries for the period 1980-2003.
Data sources are obtained from two sources, the main part is from the World Development Indicators published by the World Bank and the second source is from the International Country Risk Guide I ICRG. Unfortunately, the time series ofFDI inflows as a percentage of GDP for 6 countries (Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Qatar, UAE, and Yemen) are short, and therefore we could not run the VAR on them, that reduce sample to 11 countries only.
b. Description of the Variables
Net FDI Inflows as Percentage of GDP (FDIIGDP) The Net FDI inflows (FDIIGDP), is the sum of (net) equity of capital, reinvestment of earnings, other long-term capital, and short term-capital as shown in the balance of payment. The net FDI inflows is used rather than FDI stock, because data on 43 capital stock are not comprehensive, and are expressed in book values without any adjustment for inflation and exchange rate variations. Beside that the use of net FDI inflows as percentage of GDP is to avoid the possibility of having a nonstationary endogenous variable in the regression, and to control for the size of the country which naturally affects the level FDI observed by each country it quite misleading to compare countries in term of FDI flows without referring to their respective economic size-. The World Development Indicators are the sources of this variable.
Inflation Rate
Inflation rate is a key indicator of fiscal and monetary policies of a country; the stability of the price level is particularly important for the process of economic decision taking, which requires that prices perform their usual information function and that their changes remain predictable (Kamar and Bakarzhieve, 2002) . If we take the MENA economies as an example, most of them experienced a general deceleration in inflation as a result of prudent monetary and fiscal policies. Generally, tightened demand management policies and in some countries exchange rate corrections, helped to reduce external current account deficits. But despite this deceleration in inflation, it seems that the group of MENA countries adopting floating exchange rates registered higher inflation rates than the pegged group (like Jordan and other Gulf Cooperation Countries). As in year 2000, Sudan and Yemen (adopting a floating exchange rate regime) registered the highest inflation rats in the region (10% and 9%, respectively) compared to an average of 0.4% inflation rate in the Gulf Cooperation Countries (Karam, 2001 ).
This explains one of the reasons why FDI inflow -for example-in the Gulf Cooperation Countries is higher than in Yemen. According to Froot and Stei (1991) and Makki and Somwatu (2004) , a lower inflation rate should mean a better climate for investment, trade and therefore, economic growth, which has been supported by Apergis and Katrakilidis, ( 1998) when they argue that inflation and inflation uncertainty are found to affect FDI negatively. These facts could explain the use of inflation rate as a suitable proxy for macroeconomic stability. Also the World Development Indicators are the sources of this variable.
Corruption Index Cultural differences are reflected in the formal governance structures, laws, and practices, as well as in the more informal, undocumented contracting practices of the market, all of which impact firm transactions (Kostova and Zaheer, 1999) . The foreign firm must not only obtain a thorough understanding of the formal government structures that dictate the firm's external market relationships, the firm must also understand the informal practices that · facilitate, impede, or correspond with the formal processes. One significant example of informal practices involves the level of corruption in the external environment; as a part from raising the cost of doing business, corruption slows down the process of obtaining the business permits necessary for operating in the host country (Onyeiwu, 2000) . Beside that, when a country has a higher level of corruption (which is the case in most of the DCs as well as in the MENA countries) there are more covert practices about which the foreign firm is not likely to be fully knowledgeable than for a foreign firm in another country with a low level of IV. RESULTS corruption. Erlich and Lui (1999) argue that corruption appears to be higher in poorer countries than in countries with stronger economies, but occurs in virtually all economies. The DCs is a good example here; although the overall investment climate in the DCs have changed for better, but still corruption, bureaucratic red tape and duplication, exist and manage successfully to deter country. Indeed, an understanding of how FDI and uncertainty relate to corruption can aid policy developers in both governmental and private enterprise settings. For example, if a manger at a multinational firm that is considering a potential market is aware that market has pattern of high corruption followed by massive influx of FDI, certain procedures and protocols for dealing with local contacts may need to be adjusted depending on current economic situation (Robertson and Watson, 2004) .
Political risk index
The aim of the political risk rating is to provide a means of assessing the political stability of the countries covered by ICRG on a comparable basis. This is done by assigning risk points to a pre-set group of factors, termed political risk components, such as government Stability, socioeconomic conditions, military in politics, law and order, etc. According to ICRG a political risk rating of 0.0% to 49.9% indicates a very high risk; 50.0% to 59.9% high risk; 60.0% to 69.9% moderate risk; 70.0% to 79.9% low risk; and 80.0% or more very · low risk. The sign of this index is expected to be negative.
a. Variance Decomposition
The variance decomposition analysis measures the percentage of forecast error of a variable that is explained by another variable. It indicates the relative impact that one variable has upon another variable within the VAR system. The variance decomposition enables us to assess the economic significance of these impacts as the percentage of the forecast error for a variable sum to one. The orthogonalization procedure of the VAR system decomposes the forecast error variance; the component that measures the fraction in FDI explained by innovations in each of the three risks. 
b. Impulse responses of FDI to shocks in risks
The estimated impulse responses of the VAR system offer an additional way of examining how FDI inflows respond to innovations generated by each of the three risks. Tables 4 and Figure 2 summarize the impulse responses of FDI to Cholesky one standard deviation unit shock in inflation, corruption, and political risk for each country.
Starting with Algeria, its FDI inflows react positively to a shock originated in political risk, and this reaction is increasing with time (1.785 for period 10 years). However, FDI react negatively to a shock generated in inflation, and this reaction taper off very slowly with time horizon. As for Bahrain, there is unclearness about the dominant risk that affects FDI inflows, but it seems that corruption risk can be characterized to be a dominant risk; knowing that FDI reacts positively to a shock in corruption and inflation but it reacts negatively to a shock in political risk. While it is obvious for Egypt that economical risk plays a dominant role; since inflation has the most effect on FDI, whereas, FDI reacts negatively to a shock in corruption.
In the case of Iran, it is not clear which is the dominant risk, however there are some indicators that political risk relatively plays significant role in affecting FDI. The same results can be implemented for Jordan; that FDI has persistent reaction to shocks generated from political risk. In addition, FDI in Jordan reacts effectively to shocks originated in corruption. While in Morocco, cultural risk finds to play a dominant role in affecting FDI; since corruption (the proxy for cultural risk) has the major influence in affecting FDL Oman shows different picture in the reaction duration of FDI to shocks in different kinds of risks. FDI starts reacting to shocks generated in inflation from the fifth year, while it takes FDI three years to start reacting to shocks originated in both corruption and political risk. Given that the shock in the corruption has the most effect on FDI is an indication that in of Oman, cultural risk can be considered the dominant risk that affects FDI flows. This is not the case for Saudi Arabia; results in Table 4 show that the most react of FDI goes toward shocks originated in both inflation and corruption. While the way of FDI reaction to corruption risk increasing with time horizons, whilst for inflation, it seems that this reaction taper off slowly with time horizon. Concerning political risk, it is obvious that it plays a marginal role in . affecting FDI there.
In the case of Sudan, corruption risk stands the first among other risks that affect FDI inflows, one can find that the impulse responses remaining as high as -3.488 followed by inflation 1.799 at the end of tenth year. The impulse responses of FDI in Syria indicate that the shocks of corruption risk has the most effect on FDI among other risks; since FDI in general shows a slow and persistence process in responding to corruption's shocks, indicating that cultural risk is the dominant risk in Syria.
Finally, the impulse responses to FDI in Tunisia indicate that corruption and political risks affecting FDI in general more than inflation; since the reaction of FDI in this country to shocks in corruption and political characterized to be persistent, and remain as high as 1.224 and 1.19 respectively at the end of tenth year.
In sum, despite the different magnitude of the variance decomposition and the impulse responses values of FDI inflows in the Accu1111llted Response to FDI One S.D. lnOO\Illions t 2 S.E. .,
.,.
.., ... MENA countries, some observations can be made from Tables 3 and 4 
V. DISCUSSION
This paper tried to explore the most dominant risk that affects FDI inflows, and therefore discourage foreign investors from investing in the MENA countries. Taking the country characteristics into account, the chosen risks have been analyzed on FDI inflows for each country individually using the vector autoregressive technique. Results from both the variance decomposition and impulse responses analysis indicate that the cultural risk found to be the dominant risk that affects FDI inflows, and then it is followed immediately by the political risk as the second dominant risk.
The economical risk stands to be the least risk that affects FDI in the MENA countries, despite the existence of such risk, foreign investors may not give it a great deal of interest. It seems that the availability of natural resources generally in the Middle East countries, the reasonability of human costs, the importance of their geographic and strategic location, and the international political and economical agreements, have managed to eliminate the power of economical problems in the calculations of foreign investors.
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Regarding types of FDI in the MENA region, the majority of FDI are exports oriented not market oriented or an efficient one, and in some cases this investment could be inefficient or welfare-reducing or even causes environment pollution. This means that profits through exporting may be the main and only aim of the foreign investor not the benefits of the host country's market. For achieving this goal, foreign investors follow their way in dealing with the Arabic economical problems, for example they rely more on their home country in financing their investments, as a way to avoid bureaucratic administrative procedures, exchange rates, and inflation rates that are widely exist in the MENA economics (Sadik and Bolbol, 2001) . Hence it seems that there is a hidden risk behind the weakness flow of market and efficient seeking FDI in the region.
The empirical results ofthis study may shed the light on this hidden risk; which is not the famous risk that usually pointed to and called "political risk", it is the cultural risk that approves to be the. hidden and dominant risk that affecting FDI decision in the MENA in general. The following facts may give some explanations for this phenomenon:
1. The disappointing feelings of the Arab civilians toward their governments. Despite being in possession of massive oil and mineral wealth, the region has seen its average stan.dard of living decline in relation to the rest of the world. The per capita income in the Arabic countries has only grown at an annual rate of 0.5% over the last 25 years, by contrast Eastern Asian economies, despite some political instability, economic cycles and financial crisis, managed a growth rate of 4.1 %.
Today, the combined GDP in all Arabic countries is less than half of Spain. 2. The high level of corruption on both the governmental and the legislation institutions have deeply hurt the economical structure; that many of the reforms were poorly thought through or feel victim to the an inefficient administration and corruption. This has pushed the civilians to look for alternatives to their govei11II Practical experiences approved the ability of foreign investors to deal with political and economical risks as long as their riskadjustment rate of return is high as in the case of Ghana (Mmieh and Frimpong, 2004 ) . But when it comes to the cultural threats that are expanding, foreign investors need to reconsider well their motives in investment strategies in the Middle East before starting with the practical movements -regardless what is the targeted country-.
The future signs also hint that cultural risk is a contagion "disease" that could be extremely spread in all the MENA countries, this may remove the shadow from the mysterious phenomenon exists in some of the MENA countries that despite they are characterized with political stability (like Oman, Qatar, Morocco, and Yemen) or with economical stability (like Bahrain and Kuwait), they suffer from a fragile FDI inflows.
55

